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THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT:
MORALLY NECESSARY OR POLITICS
AS USUAL?
BARRY STEINHARDT*
I suspect that on this panel, I am the person who has spent the
most time on-line. I will candidly admit that I have spent
thousands of hours on-line. In those thousands of hours, informa-
tion has never come to me unintentionally. For many reasons, it
is often very difficult to find the material for which you are search-
ing. Those of you who are on-line know that the Internet does not
need traffic cops, it needs road maps.
I had hoped that I was going to have a little time to enjoy myself
and "wax philosophic" because this is a law school audience. I see,
however, that I am going to have to spend most of my time talking
in more practical terms, as a working civil libertarian and as a
parent.
As a working civil libertarian, I represent an organization with
real clients and real cases-for example, the combined case of
ACLU v. Reno and American Library Association v. Reno, the case
before the three court panel in Philadelphia.1 In this case, we
challenge three sections of the Telecommunications Act:2 the pure
indecency section,3 the patently offensive section which I like to
* J.D., Northeastern University School of Law. Barry Steinhardt is the Associate Direc-
tor of the National Office of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Chair of the
ACLU's Cyber Liberties Task Force. Mr. Steinhardt is responsible for the organizational
development of the ACLUs affiliates in each state and the development of organizational
policy. His previous positions include Executive Director of the ACLU affiliates in Penn-
sylvania and Vermont, and Director of the Vermont Public Interest Research Group.
Mr. Steinhardt has published articles in a variety of publications, including: Business
and Society Review; U.S.A. Today; Net Guide; The Philadelphia Inquirer; and the Pitts-
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the 1995 OSCE Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations in Warsaw, Poland.
1 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
2 Telecommunications Act, Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
3 Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133 (describing transmissions which are "obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person").
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refer to as the "naked indecency" section,4 and the amendment to
the old Comstock law.6
The Comstock law was a turn of the century piece of federal leg-
islation that prohibited the distribution of information about con-
traception or abortion.6 Literally at the last moment, Representa-
tive Henry Hyde slipped into the conference committee report, in
a way that various members of the conference committee say they
had not even realized, an amendment to the Comstock law to
cover the distribution of that information by telecommunications
devices [i.e., the Internet].7
In court, we find ourselves actually in a rather curious position
in that the Justice Department has agreed not to enforce any of
the three sections we are challenging during the pendency of this
suit. On the Comstock Act provision, the Justice Department has
orally conceded its unconstitutionality.8
On the ACLU's Web site is information on how to obtain an
abortion. The names of our reproductive rights cases alone pro-
vide such information. One of our clients, Planned Parenthood of
America, obviously has such information on its Web site and in its
non-digital communications. The Comstock law covers not only
on-line communications, but all communications.9
We have been trying to remind the Justice Department that we
are going to have an election this November, and that Janet Reno
may not be Attorney General in January and Bill Clinton may not
be President. It is not inconceivable that Henry Hyde himself
could be Attorney General. He is, afterall, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee.
I raise the Comstock law issue here, which some of the propo-
nents of the Communications Decency Act have said is a red her-
4 Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133-34 (describing transmission to persons under 18 that, "in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs... ").
5 Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 137 (amending Comstock law's prohibition on distribution of
information about abortion services to include transmission on interactive computer
services).
6 Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598, 598-99 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1461, 1465 (1994)).
7 See, e.g., Eric Zorn, Hyde's Tinkering With an Old Law Raises New Fears, Cm. TRm.,
Mar. 20, 1996, at 1 (noting controversy over amendment by Rep. Henry Hyde regarding
restraint on flow of abortion information through telecommunication devices).
8 See, e.g., Statement by President of the United States, Feb. 12, 1996, available in 1996
WL 189556, at *6 (Leg. Hist.) (stating that Justice Department advised President Clinton
that amendment to Comstock Law violates First Amendment).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1996).
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ring, not because it is a red herring, because it is a red flag. It is a
red flag symbolizing the irresponsibility of this statute.10
The proponents of this statute, and I have debated most of them
by now, refuse in many respects to own up to what it actually
says. I said to one of them the other day, "why don't you just con-
fess to what you actually did and stop pretending that the law
covers only 'hard core pornography.'" This is a bill that does, in
fact, ban indecency on on-line communications and restricts
adults to only that speech which would be acceptable for children.
At least that is its intention.
The notion that those who speak on-line know who their audi-
ence is and, therefore, can protect themselves against a communi-
cation that may be accessed by a minor, is pure nonsense. No one
knows who the readers of Use Net news groups are. That is a
plain and simple fact that you know if you are on-line. No one
knows who is participating in a chat room. One of the things peo-
ple do on-line is assume different identities, even if users identify
themselves as an adult or a man or a woman, you cannot know
that for certain that it is true.11
We have real clients who are in real jeopardy by this statute.
For example, we represent an organization called The Critical
Path AIDS Project. The Critical Path AIDS Project is an organi-
zation in Philadelphia, that has a Web site on which they publish
information about safe sex practices. They publish that informa-
tion for free, they are a non-profit organization trying to educate
young people. Their goal is to prevent the transmission of HIV
and other sexually transmitted diseases. They publish informa-
tion which uses street terms and is graphic. It has to be, they say,
in order to be effective. I believe they are right.
They come to the court in Philadelphia saying, "we do not know
if we are covered by this statute. We are publishing on-line to an
10 See Daniel G. Berystein & Michelle W. Cohen, Federal Legislation Confronts Cyber-
smut, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1996, at S8 (concluding that Communications Decency Act pro-
vides vague defenses as well as advocating "delicate balance" between policing of Internet
and beneficial use of Information Superhighway); see also Richard Raysman & Peter
Brown, Liability of Internet Access Provider Under Decency Act, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 1996, at
3 (noting that since ACLU v. Reno court did not grant temporary restraining order regard-
ing amendment to Comstock law, Internet access providers must safeguard actions to avoid
liability).
11 See, e.g., Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges
to the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1664-65 (1995) (observing that
anonymous messages are facet of communication in cyberspace that cannot be completely
eliminated).
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audience that we know includes children, in fact, we intend to
reach minors with this communication. We do not know if this
material, which is clearly sexual in nature, will be patently offen-
sive to whatever community standards are found to apply."
In the real world, in which these statutes operate, such groups
are just the sort of groups who will be targeted for prosecution.
Targeted groups of individuals and organizations are unpopular
and are relatively powerless in many communities. The Critical
Path Aids Project happens to be a group primarily comprised of
gay men with HIV.
They know from their own experience of being harassed by po-
lice officials in the city of Philadelphia, in the shadow of the Lib-
erty Bell, that there are going to be communities out there where
the kind of information they publish will subject them to prosecu-
tion for engaging in "indecent" speech in a manner that is accessi-
ble to children.
This is the real world. I believe those of you who are on the Net
also know that the notion that the Internet is awash in pornogra-
phy and that pornography and sexual materials dominate the In-
ternet is pure hogwash.
It has been the subject of much media hype. Some of you re-
member the lurid cover story in Time magazine 12 that touted the
Rimm study13 published in the Georgetown Law Review,' 4 which
was later debunked.' 5 Even the government which first appended
that study to its answer in our case later backed off, having read
the criticisms, and when we put an expert witness on the stand,
who was one of the debunkers.
In many respects, we are dealing with smoke screens here. We
often hear about pedophiles on the Internet. Well let me tell you,
in addition to someone who will proudly confess to having been on
the Internet, I will proudly tell you that I have a seven-year-old
12 See, e.g., Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995,
at 38 (citing Rimm article and Carnegie Melon study of pornography on-line).
13 Id. at 38 (describing how 18-month study produced close to one million sexually ex-
plicit pictures, descriptions, short stories, and film clips).
14 Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million
Times by Consumers in over 2000 cities in Forty Countries, Provinces and territories, 83
GEo. L.J. 1849 (1995).
15 See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Critics Troubled by Computer Study on Pornography, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 3, 1996, at A5 (noting that critics contend evidence revealing prevalence of
pornography on-line is "unscientific and sensationalistic").
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daughter. My seven-year-old daughter is on-line. I must tell you
that I am a lot less concerned when she is on-line than I am when
she is in a public park. The notion that a pedophile is somehow
going to reach through the screen and grab my daughter is ab-
surd. In-line skating is a lot more dangerous than on-line commu-
nications to my seven-year-old daughter. Let us have a reality
check here. The Communications Indecency Act is an attempt to
stifle a new medium at its inception and an attempt to impose a
particular set of moral values on the Internet.' 6
Let me conclude with one other thought. If Mike Godwin from
the Electronic Frontier Foundation was here, he would have noted
this, but I will say it in his absence. John Gilmore, one of the
founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said that in cyber-
space the United States Constitution is just a local ordinance.
The reality is that we are talking about a global medium.17 That
has profound implications that I do not believe any of us truly
understand.
One of the clear implications of this new reality, however, is
that this is not speech that the United States government is going
to be able to control. It is in fact as easy to access a computer that
sits in Finland, where they have much more liberal laws with re-
spect to free speech than we do, as it is to access one in Flatbush.
The United States government is not going to be able to reach the
speech from Finland. This is a reality.
This is a war on indecency which, in the end, cannot be won by
the government. Like any war, however, there will be innocent
casualties. One casualty may be that local ordinance, the First
Amendment,' while other casualties may be the very real clients
that we represent who are put at risk by this statute.
16 Cf., e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1801 (1995) (arguing that when government bans indecent or ifithy material on-line,
whether least restrictive means of preventing harm has been chosen, is paramount ques-
tion to be asked).
17 See Mike Godwin, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L.
REv. 1, 14 (1994) (asserting that Internet and Usenet are uncensorable due to global envi-
ronment); see also Henry J. Reske, Computer Porn: A Prosecutorial Challenge, 80 A.B.A. J.
40, 40 (1994) (noting that material on-line can originate anywhere and be transmitted
around globe).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." Id.
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